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Is mindfulness Buddhist?
(and why it matters)
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University of California, Berkeley
Abstract
Modern exponents of mindfulness meditation promote the therapeutic effects of “bare
attention”—a sort of non-judgmental, non-discursive attending to the moment-to-
moment flow of consciousness. This approach to Buddhist meditation can be traced
to Burmese Buddhist reform movements of the first half of the 20th century, and is
arguably at odds with more traditional Therava¯da Buddhist doctrine and meditative
practices. But the cultivation of present-centered awareness is not without precedent
in Buddhist history; similar innovations arose in medieval Chinese Zen (Chan) and
Tibetan Dzogchen. These movements have several things in common. In each case
the reforms were, in part, attempts to render Buddhist practice and insight accessible
to laypersons unfamiliar with Buddhist philosophy and/or unwilling to adopt a renunci-
atory lifestyle. In addition, these movements all promised astonishingly quick results.
And finally, the innovations in practice were met with suspicion and criticism from
traditional Buddhist quarters. Those interested in the therapeutic effects of mindfulness
and bare attention are often not aware of the existence, much less the content, of the
controversies surrounding these practices in Asian Buddhist history.
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Introduction
In a chapter in an edited volume on the role of culture in depression, Gananath
Obeyesekere begins by quoting from Brown and Harris’s influential 1978 study on
the social origins of depression in women:
The immediate response to loss of an important source of positive value is likely to be
a sense of hopelessness, accompanied by a gamut of feelings, ranging from distress,
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depression, and shame to anger. Feelings of hopelessness will not always be restricted
to the provoking incident—large or small. It may lead to thoughts about the hope-
lessness of one’s life in general. It is such generalization of hopelessness that we believe
forms the central core of depressive disorder. (Brown & Harris, 1978, p. 235)
To this Obeyesekere responds:
This statement sounds strange to me, a Buddhist, for if it was placed in the context of
Sri Lanka, I would say that we are not dealing with a depressive but a good Buddhist.
The Buddhist would take one further step in generalization: it is not simply the general
hopelessness of one’s own lot; that hopelessness lies in the nature of the world,
and salvation lies in understanding and overcoming that hopelessness.
(Obeyesekere, 1985, p. 134)
One might want to quibble with Obeyesekere; one might demand more
evidence—both psychological and ethnographic—for the similarities he sees
between good Sri Lankan Buddhists and American depressives. Do Sri Lankan
Buddhists really aspire to a state that we would associate with depression? Or is the
very idea of depression so culturally and historically constructed as to mitigate its
cross-cultural utility? However one parses these issues, on purely doctrinal grounds
Obeyesekere has a point: early Buddhist sutras in general, and Theravada teachings
in particular, hold that (1) to live is to suffer, (2) the only genuine remedy to suffer-
ing is escape from samsara (the phenomenal world) altogether, and (3) escape
requires, among other things, abandoning hope that happiness in this world is
possible.
If one has any doubts, consider the advanced stages of insight described in the
Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga), an authoritative Pali compendium composed
by the 5th-century monk Buddhaghosa in Sri Lanka. After an exhaustive account
of the various practices and meditative states discussed in the scriptures,
Buddhaghosa turns to the ascending “stages of insight” that immediately precede
the attainment of liberation. The eight stages of insight include “knowledge of
dissolution,” “knowledge of appearance as terror,” and “knowledge of danger,”
and Buddhaghosa resorts to vivid similes to capture the affective tone that accom-
panies these rarefied states. One of the most harrowing is found in the description
of “knowledge of appearance as terror”:
A woman’s three sons had offended against the king, it seems. The king ordered their
heads to be cut off. She went with her sons to the place of their execution. When they
had cut off the eldest one’s head, they set about cutting off the middle one’s head.
Seeing the eldest one’s head already cut off and the middle one’s head being cut off,
she gave up hope for the youngest, thinking, “He too will fare like them.” Now, the
meditator’s seeing the cessation of past formations is like the woman’s seeing the
eldest son’s head cut off. His seeing the cessation of those present is like her seeing
the middle one’s head being cut off. His seeing the cessation of those in the future,
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thinking, “Formations to be generated in the future will cease too,” is like her giving
up hope for the youngest son, thinking, “He too will fare like them.” When he sees in
this way, knowledge of appearance as terror arises in him at that stage. (Buddhaghosa,
1956/1976, Vol. 2, p. 753)
In other words, the emotional valence of this advanced stage of insight is likened to
that of a mother being forced to witness the execution of all three of her sons.
Could one imagine a more disturbing image of human anguish? Yet, according to
Theravada teachings, it is necessary to experience such despair—to confront the
unmitigated horror of sentient existence—so as to acquire the resolve necessary to
abandon the last vestiges of attachment to things of this world. Obeyesekere would
seem to have a point: states akin to what we identify as “depression” would seem to
be valorized, if only for the insight they engender, on the Buddhist path.
Yet today Buddhist insight is touted as the very antithesis of depression. Rather
than cultivating a desire to abandon the world, Buddhism is seen as a science of
happiness—a way of easing the pain of existence.1 Buddhist practice is reduced to
meditation, and meditation, in turn, is reduced to mindfulness, which is touted as a
therapeutic practice that leads to an emotionally fulfilling and rewarding life.
Mindfulness is promoted as a cure-all for anxiety and affective disorders including
post-traumatic stress, for alcoholism and drug dependency, for attention-deficit
disorder, for anti-social and criminal behavior, and for the commonplace debilitat-
ing stresses of modern urban life.
Buddhist modernism and the rhetoric of bare attention
The notion that Buddhism is a rational, empirical, and therapeutically oriented
tradition compatible with modern science is one of the characteristic features of
“Buddhist modernism” (sometimes known as “Protestant Buddhism”), an
approach to Buddhism that evolved out of a complex intellectual exchange between
Asia and the West that took place over the last 150 years or so. As there is now a
robust literature on this subject, there is little need to rehearse it here.2 My focus is
on the particular practice most characteristic of Buddhist modernism, namely,
“mindfulness” (Pali: sati, Sanskrit: smr
_
ti), and more specifically, the interpretation
of mindfulness as “bare attention” or “present-centered awareness,” by which is
meant a sort of non-judgmental, non-discursive attending to the here-and-now.
Scholars have argued that the widespread understanding of mindfulness as bare
attention has its roots in the Theravada meditation revival of the 20th century, a
movement that drew its authority, if not its content, from the two recensions of the




h ana-sutta),3 as well as
Buddhaghosa’s Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga), and a few other Pali sources.




h ana or Vipassan a
(“insight”) movement, as it came to be known, were developed by a handful of
Burmese teachers in the lineages of Ledi Sayadaw (U Nyanadaza, 1846/7–1923)
and Mingun Sayadaw (U Narada, 1870–1955).4 Mingun’s disciple, Mahası
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Sayadaw (1904–1982), developed the technique that is best known today, in which
the practitioner is trained to focus on whatever sensory object arises in the
moment-to-moment flow of consciousness. Mahası designed this method with lay-
persons in mind, including those with little or no prior exposure to Buddhist doc-
trine or liturgical practice.5 Perhaps most radical was Mahası’s claim that the
cultivation of liberating insight did not require advanced skill in concentration
(samatha) or the experience of absorption (jh ana). Instead, Mahası placed emphasis
on the notion of sati, understood as the moment-to-moment, lucid, non-reactive,
non-judgmental awareness of whatever appears to consciousness. One of Mahası’s
most influential students, the German born monk Nyanaponika Thera (Siegmund
Feniger, 1901–1994), coined the term “bare attention” for this mental faculty, and
this rubric took hold through his popular 1954 book The Heart of Buddhist
Meditation.6
Western Buddhist enthusiasts may have a hard time appreciating just how rad-
ical Mahası’s method was in its day. Designed to be accessible to laypersons, it did
not require familiarity with Buddhist philosophy or literature, most notably with
the scholastic literature known as abhidhamma. (Traditional forms of Theravada
meditation required proficiency in the categories and methods of abhidhamma ana-
lysis.) It also did not require renunciation of lay life, and it could be taught in a
relatively short period of time in a retreat format. All this made it easy to export,
and it has been influential not only in the Southeast Asian Theravada world, but
also among modern Tibetan, Chinese, Korean, Japanese, and Vietnamese religious
reformers. By the end of the 20th century, Mahası’s approach to mindfulness,
understood as “bare attention” and “living in the here and now,” had emerged
as one of the foundations of Buddhist modernism—an approach to Buddhism that
cut across geographical, cultural, sectarian, and social boundaries.7
The meaning of the term “mindfulness” is presumed by many to be self-evident,
and thus modern exponents of mindfulness meditation may see little need to
explore the intellectual history of the concept in Buddhism.8 “Mindfulness” is a
translation of the Sanskrit smr
_
ti (Pali: sati), a term that originally meant “to
remember,” “to recollect,” “to bear in mind.” Its religious significance is sometimes
traced to the Vedic emphasis on setting to memory the authoritative teachings of
the tradition. The Pali term sati retains this sense of “remembering” in the Nikayas
(the scriptures attributed to the Buddha in the Theravada school): “And what,
bhikkhus, is the faculty of sati? Here, bhikkhus, the noble disciple has sati, he is
endowed with perfect sati and intellect, he is one who remembers, who recollects
what was done and said long before.”9 Moreover, the faculties of recollection and
reflection were unarguably central to a variety of classical practices associated with
smr
_
ti, including buddh anusmr
_
ti or “recollection of the Buddha,” which typically
involves some combination of recalling the characteristics of the Buddha, visualiz-
ing him, and chanting his name.




h ana-sutta, the term sati retains a sense of “recollecting” or
“bearing in mind.” Specifically, sati involves bearing in mind the virtuous dharmas
so as to properly apprehend, from moment to moment, the true nature
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of phenomena. At least this is the explanation found in early Pali exegetical works
such as the Milindapan˜ha10 and the commentaries of Buddhaghosa.11 Rupert
Gethin (1992), who has undertaken a careful analysis of such passages, notes
that sati cannot refer to “remembering” in any simple sense, since memories are,
as Buddhists are quick to acknowledge, subject to distortion. Rather, sati
should be understood as what allows awareness of the full range and extent of dham-
mas; sati is an awareness of things in relation to things, and hence an awareness of




h anas, presumably what this means is that
sati is what causes the practitioner of yoga to “remember” that any feeling he may
experience exists in relation to a whole variety or world of feelings that may be skillful
or unskillful, with faults or faultless, relatively inferior or refined, dark or pure.
(Gethin, 1992, p. 39)
In short, there is little “bare” about the faculty of sati, since it entails, among other
things, the proper discrimination of the moral valence of phenomena as
they arise.12
Critiques of mindfulness as bare attention
There are, in addition, philosophical objections to construing sati as bare attention.
The popular understanding of bare attention presumes that it is possible to disag-
gregate pre-reflective sensations (what contemporary philosophers sometimes refer
to as “raw feels” or qualia) from perceptual experience writ large. In other words,
there is an assumption that our recognition of and response to an object is logically
and/or temporally preceded by an unconstructed or “pure” impression of said
object that can be rendered, at least with mental training, available to conscious
experience. Mindfulness practice is then a means to quiet the ongoing chatter of the
mind and to keep to the “bare registering of the facts observed.”
Superficially, this notion of mindfulness as bare attention would seem tied to
a view of the mind as a sort of tabula rasa or clear mirror that passively
registers raw sensations prior to any recognition, judgment, or response. The
notion of a conscious state devoid of conceptualization or discrimination is not
unknown to Buddhist exegetes; indeed, later Buddhist philosophers associated
with pram an
_
a (logic) and yog ac ara (mental construction) systems posit a “non-
conceptual cognition” (nirvikalpajn˜ ana) that operates by means of “direct per-
ception” (pratyaks
_
ajn˜ ana), and these authors use the imagery of the mirror to
illustrate the relationship between pure mind and defiled object. This state is
sometimes understood as preceding (or undergirding) the arising of conceptual-
ization, or as an advanced stage of attainment tantamount to awakening.13 But
while the notion of non-conceptual cognition became important in some
yog ac ara systems (not to mention Tibetan Dzogchen), it remained at odds
with the Theravada analysis of mind and perception. In Theravada abhidharma,
consciousness and the object of consciousness emerge codependently and are
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hence phenomenologically inextricable. That is to say, the objects of experience
appear not upon a preexistent tabula rasa, but rather within a cognitive
matrix that includes affective and discursive dispositions occasioned by one’s
past activity (karma).14 The elimination of these attendant dispositions does
not yield “non-conceptual awareness” so much as the cessation of consciousness
itself.15 Arguing along similar lines, Paul Griffiths suggests that the closest thing
to a state of unconstructed or pure experience in classical Indian Buddhist
literature is nirodhasam apatti—a condition in which both objects and conscious
experience cease altogether (Griffiths, 1986, 1990; Sharf, 2014a). In such a
framework, it seems misleading to construe any mode of attention or perception
as “bare.” The psychological model behind Nyanaponika’s understanding of
sati as bare attention may owe more to internalist and empiricist epistemologies
than it owes to early Buddhist or traditional Theravada formulations
(Sharf, 1998).
Given the ambiguities surrounding sati, it is not surprising that the Mahası
method quickly came under fire from a number of quarters, including both
Theravada traditionalists in Southeast Asia and practitioners and scholars in the
West. Critics object to (1) Mahası’s devaluation of concentration techniques lead-
ing to absorption (Pali: jh ana); (2) claims that practitioners of the Mahası method
are able to attain advanced stages of the path, including the four stages of enlight-
enment (Pali: ariya-magga), in remarkably short periods of time; and (3) the ethics
of rendering sati as bare attention, which would seem to devalue or neglect the
importance of ethical judgment.16
In my own work on the roots of the Zen (Chinese: Chan) tradition in 8th-
century China, I found that certain early Zen teachers seem to have turned away
from traditional forms of meditation—repentance practices, meditations on
corpses and the impurity of the body, and so on—in favor of instructing their
disciples to simply set aside all distinctions and conceptualizations, and allow the
mind to come to rest in the flow of the here-and-now (Sharf, 2014b). It may not be
a coincidence that the teachers who advocated this new style of practice were also
those who had garnered a sizable lay audience, an audience that presumably had
little interest in monastic renunciation and little background in Buddhist doctrine.
So these early Zen techniques, which went under the rubrics of “viewing mind”
(kanxin), “discerning mind” (guanxin), “reflecting without an object” (wu suo nian),
and so on, were, like “bare attention,” seen as direct approaches that circumvented
the need for traditional dhy ana attainments, for mastery of scripture and doctrine,
and for proficiency in monastic ritual. In brief, the early Zen technique (or tech-
niques—it is difficult to determine whether these terms were referring to one and
the same practice) revolved around a seemingly simple figure–ground shift, wherein
attention is directed away from objects of any kind toward the abiding “luminos-
ity” or “transparency” of mind or awareness itself. The early Zen reformers, like
the Burmese reformers in the 20th century, were popularizers: they touted a
method that was simple, promised quick results, and could be cultivated by
anyone in a short period of time. Indeed, one early Zen text, attributed to the
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fourth patriarch Daoxin (580–651), actually traces the technique back to
Layman Fu.17
Early Zen was not the only pre-modern Buddhist tradition to develop something
akin to “bare attention”; one finds it in Tibetan Dzogchen as well, which is not
surprising as there is evidence, albeit controversial, that Dzogchen was itself influ-
enced by Zen.18 I do not want to engage the thorny issue of whether these trad-
itions were referencing a common meditative experience or state of consciousness.19
Rather, I would draw attention to certain institutional and sociological paral-
lels—to the fact that the early Zen patriarchs and Dzogchen masters, like their
modern Burmese counterparts, were interested in developing a method simple
enough to be accessible to those who were unschooled in Buddhist doctrine and
scripture, who were not necessarily wedded to classical Indian cosmology, who may
not have had the time or inclination for extended monastic practice, and who were
interested in immediate results as opposed to incremental advancement over count-
less lifetimes. It is thus not surprising that the early Zen and Dzogchen teachers
found themselves in the same position as Mahası: castigated for dumbing down the
tradition, for devaluing ethical training, for misconstruing or devaluing the role of
wisdom, and for their crassly “instrumental” approach to practice.
Those interested in the scientific, empirical study of mindfulness today would do
well to pay attention to some of these criticisms. The Tang master Mazu Daoyi
(709–788), for example—a celebrated representative of the Hongzhou Zen lin-
eage—was noted for his rejection of the more scholastic interests of the monks
in his day, and he is particularly associated with the idea of a sudden, almost
spontaneous, realization of one’s buddha nature or “true mind.” But Guifeng
Zongmi (780–841), another celebrated master and chronicler of early Zen, had
deep misgivings. He believed that the Hongzhou method, which he characterizes
as “simply giving free rein to the mind” (dan renxin), failed to distinguish between
right and wrong.20 Indeed, a not uncommon criticism was that the excessive focus
in meditation on achieving “inner stillness” (ningji), especially when unbalanced by
an engagement with the scriptures, leads to a state described as “falling into emp-
tiness” (duokong), which is, in turn, associated with “meditation sickness”
(chanbing).21 The term meditation sickness was used by various Buddhist masters
as a critique of practices they deemed detrimental to the path, notably techniques
that emphasized inner stillness—they seem to have been targeting practices that
cultivated a sort of non-critical or non-analytical presentness. Today we might
translate “meditation sickness” as “zoning out,” by which I do not mean being
lost in thought or daydreaming. Rather, I suspect that when medieval meditation
masters used terms such as “falling into emptiness” and “meditation sickness,” they
were targeting techniques that resulted in an intense immersion in the moment, in
the now, such that the practitioner loses touch with the socially, culturally, and
historically constructed world in which he or she lives. The practitioner becomes
estranged from the web of social relations that are the touchstone of our humanity
as well as our sanity. The key to avoiding this is to learn to see both sides at once.
Zongmi says: “While awakening from delusion is sudden, the transformation of an
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unenlightened person into an enlightened person is gradual.” From a more trad-
itional Buddhist perspective, what is missing in the modern mindfulness movement
is precisely this gradual transformation, which involves active engagement with
Buddhist doctrine and Buddhist “forms of life” (Lebensform).22
The modern mindfulness movement
This engagement with Buddhist scripture, doctrine, ritual, and institutions is often
rejected by modern advocates of mindfulness, who believe they can garner the
rewards of Buddhist practice without having to adopt a Buddhist form of life or
world view. Indeed, some insist that Buddhist practice does not entail a worldview
at all; rather than a process of reconditioning, they claim that Buddhist meditation,
properly understood, is a process of deconditioning—of setting aside our culturally
constructed notions of reality so as to see things “as they really are.” The object,
they believe, is to put an end to the ceaseless inner chatter of the mind—to stop
thinking. The epistemological and metaphysical commitments behind this are viv-
idly illustrated in Jill Bolte Taylor’s popular book (2008) and TED Video,23 both of
which are titled “My Stroke of Insight.” Taylor, a brain scientist, experienced what
she believes is a taste of Buddhist nirv an
_
a as the result of a debilitating stroke that
compromised areas of her left hemisphere. She writes:
As the language centers in my left hemisphere grew increasingly silent and I became
detached from the memories of my life, I was comforted by an expanding sense of
grace. In this void of higher cognition and details pertaining to my normal life, my
consciousness soared into an all-knowingness, a “being at one” with the universe.
(Taylor, 2008, p. 41)
Taylor holds that if we can just quiet the inner voice in our left brain, we will
spontaneously experience the nirv an
_
a that is always present in our right brain
(Taylor, 2008, p. 116).
In short, the rhetoric of “bare attention” is predicated on an often unacknow-
ledged commitment to what scholars of religious mysticism call
“perennialism”—the notion that there is a singular, transcultural, trans-historical,
and spiritual experience that is common to mystics around the globe.24 The per-
ennial experience is, in itself, unconstructed: it is free of local cultural, linguistic, or
social inflections, although such inflections invariably color any and all descriptions
or analyses of such a state. More specifically, the popular understanding of mind-
fulness seems to be associated with an understanding of perennialism that is some-
times called the “filter theory.” The filter theory, vividly illustrated in Taylor’s
narrative, holds that our normal sensory and discursive processes, rather than
opening us to reality, actually serve to filter it out. The Indian master
Kamalas´ıla (fl. 740–795), in his critique of the Chinese Zen master Heshang
Moheyan (d.u.) in a famous 8th-century Tibetan debate, pointed out that there
is a particular place for yogis who erroneously believe that the goal of meditation is
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to put an end to thinking: it is the realm of the “beings without minds,” who, after
death, will spend five hundred eons as mindless zombies (Sharf, 2014a).
Just as there is a set of metaphysical commitments that undergird the modern
mindfulness movement, there are also ethical and political commitments. The
problem is that, in America at least, these commitments so resemble those of
mainstream consumer culture that they go largely unnoticed. Note that, in the
early period at least, the Buddhist institution—known as the sam
_
gha—comprised
a renunciate community that embodied, quite literally, a critique of mainstream
social values and cultural norms. For the sam
_
gha, liberation required “letting go,”
and letting go did not mean to merely adopt a particular attitude or psychological
frame, however important such a frame may be. Rather, it necessitated a radical
change in the way one lived; one was required to opt out of family ties and worldly
pursuits, and opt into an alternative, communal, celibate, and highly regulated
lifestyle. Modern teachers of mindfulness rarely make such demands of their stu-
dents; the liberating, or if you will therapeutic, benefits apparently do not require
dramatic changes in the way one lives. Rather than enjoining practitioners to
renounce carnal and sensual pleasure, mindfulness is touted as a way to more
fulfilling sensual experiences. Rather than enjoining practitioners to renounce
mainstream American culture, mindfulness is seen as a way to better cope with
it. There may be no better exemplar of this ethically dubious and politically reac-
tionary stance than Tricycle Magazine, with its advertisements for expensive medi-
tation gear, for dharmic dating services, dharmic dentists and accountants, and its
implicit authorization of the entrepreneurial and commercial activities of countless
dharma centers and self-styled Buddhist masters. The packaging of mindfulness in
programs such as Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) and Mindfulness-
Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) is arguably a variant on the same theme.
Could it be that this socially conservative ideology is tied to the particular
ideological strand in modern Buddhism that I have identified as perennialism?
Arguments to similar effect have been made by, among others, Hannah Arendt
and Emmanuel Le´vinas (Sharf, 1995b, pp. 50–51), but perhaps most relevant is
the so-called “Critical Buddhism” (hihan bukky o) movement that emerged out of
Japanese S ot o Zen in the 1990s. The leaders (and possibly sole members) of this
movement, Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shir o, claimed that the ethical
failings of Japanese Buddhist schools—notably their complicity in the militarist
and nationalist fever that led up to the Pacific War—could be traced, in part, to
buddha-nature theory (Hubbard & Swanson, 1997). (The doctrine of inherent
buddha-nature holds, in brief, that we are all naturally endowed with the awa-
kened state of the buddhas but fail to recognize it.) Their argument, in short, is
that the East Asian Buddhist tradition largely abandoned the more analytical and
critical dimensions of Indian Mahayana, aligning itself instead with buddha-
nature doctrine, and that this led to a kind of ethical, social, and political pas-
sivity. This is not the place to weigh in on this issue, except to note that this
critique too emerges not from without, but from within the Buddhist tradition
itself.25
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Conclusion
To conclude, it is my impression that many of the psychologists, cognitive scien-
tists, and sociologists doing research on Burmese style mindfulness practices seem
to assume that the psychological benefits of such practice are born out by centuries
of Buddhist experience. Such is not the case. To the extent that the modern
approach to mindfulness can be found in premodern Asia, it was a minority pos-
ition that was met with considerable criticism from traditional quarters. The nature
of the criticism warrants our attention, as it parallels criticism directed against
Mahası’s technique in modern Southeast Asia. Thus we hear the charge that
such practices emphasize momentary states rather than long-term transformation,
that they do not yield the benefits that are claimed on their behalf, that they are
more Hindu than Buddhist, and that the overriding emphasis on inner stillness, in
the absence of critical intellectual engagement with the teachings, can lead to a
paralyzing state of self-absorption—what East Asian Buddhists have long identi-
fied as “meditation sickness” (Ahn, 2007).
To be clear, I am not claiming that mindfulness has no therapeutic value. I
am aware of the claims, based on a substantial body of empirical (if contested)
data, that suggests it does. But my own experience among long-term meditators
in Asian monastic settings as well as in American practice centers leads me to
be somewhat skeptical, and I sometimes wonder if researchers in this area are
asking the right questions of the right people. It is not just that advanced
meditation practitioners in more traditional Asian settings may not exhibit the
kinds of behavior that we associate with mental health. It is that, as
Obeyesekere noted, it is not clear that they aspire to our model of mental
health in the first place. And this, I submit, is the real challenge for those
interested in the causal relationship between traditional forms of Buddhist medi-
tation and the psychological and behavioral outcomes that such meditation is
assumed to produce.
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Notes
1. For a history of the construal of Buddhism as a “science of happiness” see especially
Lopez (2008, 2012).
2. The literature on Buddhist modernism is large and growing; see, for example, the collec-
tion of papers in Lopez (1995), as well as Gombrich & Obeyesekere (1988), McMahan










nik aya 22); cf. the Chinese Nian chu jing (Taish o shinsh u daiz oky o, No. 26, Vol. 1,
pp. 582b–84c).
4. On Ledi Sayadaw, see especially Braun (2013); on Mingun Sayadaw, see Houtman (1997,
p. 311).
5. On Mahası’s pivotal role in the Burmese lay meditation movement, in addition
to Braun (2013), see Jordt (2007). Braun believes that the lay orientation can be
traced back to Ledi who was influenced by, among others, his mentor Hpo Hlaing
(1830–1885), a layperson working in the Burmese court environment. Hpo Hlaing
wrote two popular books on meditation, Taste of Liberation (Vimuttirasa, 1871)
and the Meditation on the Body (K ayanupassan a, 1874), both of which “reveal a
concern for a lay readership and an effort to show meditation’s relevance to know-
ledge about the modern world that presage and likely informed Ledi’s presentation of
meditation” (Braun, 2013, p. 31). Ledi came to believe that laypersons are capable of
advanced stages on the path and that awakening is possible in this very lifetime
(Braun, 2013, p. 119), both of which are integral to the ideology of Buddhist mod-
ernism. Mahası’s teacher Mingun is sometimes given credit for establishing the first
meditation center in Burma open to laypersons as well as monastics (Houtman,
1997, p. 311).
6. Nyanaponika (1973, p. 40) describes it as follows: “Bare Attention is concerned only with
the present. It teaches what so many have forgotten: to live with full awareness in the
Here and Now. It teaches us to face the present without trying to escape into thoughts
about the past or the future. Past and future are, for average consciousness, not objects of
observation, but of reflection. And, in ordinary life, the past and the future are taken but
rarely as objects of truly wise reflection, but are mostly just objects of day-dreaming and
vain imaginings which are the main foes of Right Mindfulness, Right Understanding and
Right Action as well. Bare Attention, keeping faithfully to its post of observation,
watches calmly and without attachment the unceasing march of time; it waits quietly
for the things of the future to appear before its eyes, thus to turn into present objects and
to vanish again into the past.”
7. The secondary literature on the “Mahası method” is vast. On the complex doctrinal issues
surrounding Mahası’s method, see especially Cousins (1996); on the influence of the
Mahası method in contemporary Thai monastic and lay practice, see Cook (2010); for
its influence in Nepal, see LeVine and Gellner (2005).
8. As much has been written of late about the term sati/smr
_
ti I will only touch upon it here.
In my discussion I am drawing largely on Gethin (1992, pp. 36–44), but see also Gyatso
(1992), Kuan (2008), Nyanaponika (1976, pp. 68–72), Shulman (2010), and the special
2011 issue of Contemporary Buddhism on the topic “Mindfulness: diverse perspectives on
its meaning, origins, and multiple applications at the intersection of science and dharma”
(Vol. 12, No. 1).
9. Sam
_
yutta-nik aya Vol. 5, pp. 197–198; trans. Gethin (1992, p. 36).
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10. “Just as, Your Majesty, the treasurer of a king who is a cakka-vattin causes the cakka-
vattin king to remember his glory evening and morning [saying], ‘So many, lord, are
your elephants, so many your horses, so many your chariots, so many your foot soldiers,
so much your gold, so much your wealth, so much your property; may my lord remem-
ber.’ Thus he calls to mind the king’s property. Even so, your Majesty, sati, when it
arises, calls to mind dhammas that are skillful and unskillful, with faults and faultless,
inferior and refined, dark and pure, together with their counterparts: these are the four
establishings of mindfulness, these are the four right endeavors, these are the four bases
of success, these are the five faculties, these are the five powers, these are the seven
awakening-factors, this is the noble eight-factored path, this is calm, this is insight, this
is knowledge, this is freedom.” Milindapan˜ha 37; trans. Gethin (1992, p. 37).
11. “By means of it they [i.e., other dhammas] remember, or it itself remembers, or it is
simply just remembering, thus it is sati. Its characteristic is not floating; its property is
not losing; its manifestation is guarding or the state of being face to face with an object;




h anas of the body and so on. It should be seen as
like a post due to its state of being firmly set in the object, and as like a gatekeeper
because it guards the gate of the eye and so on.” Visuddhimagga XIV, 141; trans. Gethin
(1992, p. 40).
12. On the relationship between smr
_
ti and memory and smr
_
ti as mindfulness, see especially
Cox (1992).
13. See, for example, the analysis in Deleanu (n.d.) and Klein and Wangyal (2006). The
notion of a non-conceptual state of consciousness was the subject of considerable dis-
cussion if not controversy, as it was not easy to square with earlier systems of Buddhist
thought. One problem was how to disambiguate states of “non-conceptualization” from
states in which there is simply no cognition whatsoever, such as nirodha-sam apatti (and,
perhaps, nirv an
_
a); see Sharf (2014a).
14. Interestingly, some recent findings in cognitive neuroscience resonate with classical
Buddhist “intentional” models; see Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991).
15. The only candidate in early Buddhist psychology for a “raw feel” might be spars´a or
“contact” (Pali: phassa), but properly speaking spars´a per se is not a conscious event so
much as an essential but subliminal constituent involved in the arising of cognition.
16. For traditionalist critiques see the overview and bibliography in Sharf (1995a, pp. 262–
265). The appropriateness of “bare attention” as a way to understand sati is the subject
of a dialogue between Alan Wallace and Bhikkhu Bodhi (Wallace & Bodhi, 2006), and is
explored at length in several of the contributions to the 2011 issue of Contemporary
Buddhism (see note 8 above).
17. On Layman Fu, or Fu Xi (a.k.a. Fu Dashi, 497–569) see Hsiao (1995, pp. 50–224),
Yanagida (1971, p. 236), and Zhang (2000). A text attributed to him, the Shanhui Daishi
lu (Zokuz oky o 69, no. 1335) contains little with regard to actual meditation technique.
18. The Dzogchen analogue to bare awareness is known variously as “awareness” (rig pa,
sometimes translated “open awareness”), “gnosis” (ye shes), “the mind of awakening”
(byang chub kyi sems), “luminosity” (‘od gsal, sometimes translated “clear light”), and so
on; see Karmay (2007), Klein and Wangyal (2006), and van Schaik (2003).
19. Elsewhere I have argued that to do so would be to misconstrue the logic of the rhetoric
of “subjective experience” (Sharf, 1998).
20. For Zongmi’s critique of Mazu and the Hongzhou school see Broughton (2009,
pp. 84–86 and passim).
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21. This language of inner stillness and falling into emptiness is found, among other places,
in the records of another Hongzhou school critic Fayan Wenyi (885–958) and his
dharma brother Xiufu (d. 951?). Wenyi’s Fayan lineage stressed the study of doctrine
and texts as a corrective; see his biography in fascicle 24 of the Jingde chuangdeng lu
(Taish o shinsh u daiz oky o no. 2076, vol. 51, p. 400b1–3), and the discussion in Welter
(2008, pp. 32–33), and Brose (2013, p. 116). Guishan Lingyou (771–853), a third-gen-
eration teacher in the Hongzhou line, was another critic of a perceived tendency toward
moral turpitude in the growing Zen movement; see Kirchner (2006) and Poceski (2006).
On meditation illness see Ahn (2007).
22. Gregory (1987, p. 286). Similar critiques can be found in the writings of many major
medieval Zen figures, from Heze Shenhui (670–762?), who played a role in the compos-
ition of the Platform Scripture, to Yongming Yanshou (904–975), a prolific and influ-
ential master of the 10th century.
23. See http://www.ted.com/talks/jill_bolte_taylor_s_powerful_stroke_of_insight.html
24. The literature on perennialism is vast; for overviews, see especially Katz (1978, 1983,
1992), Forman (1990), Proudfoot (1985), and Sharf (1998).
25. On Critical Buddhism, see especially the collection of papers in Hubbard and Swanson
(1997).
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